The Politics of Happiness: Subjective vs. Economic Measures as Measures of Social Well-Being by Angner, Erik
* 
Selection and editorial matter C> lisa Bortolotti 2009 
Chapters Q their individual authors 2009 
AU rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this 
pubUcatlon may be made without written permission. 
No portion of this publ.lcation may be reproduced, copied or transmitted 
save with written permission or in accordance with the prOVisions of the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence 
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright licensing Agency, 
Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. 
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication 
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. 
The authors have asserted their rights to be identified 
as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
First published 2009 by 
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN 
Pa!grave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, 
registered In England, company number 785998, of HoundmiUs, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire RG21 6XS. 
Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. 
!grave Macmillan is the gt al academic imprint of the above companies 
a as companies and repres tatives throughout the world. 
Palgra III and MacmlUan lll are istered trademarks in the United States, 
the Unit ingdom, Europe and her countries. 
ISBN-13: 978-0-230-22429-2 har ack 
ISBN-10: 0-230-22429-6 hardback 
This book is printed on paper suitable r recycling and made from fully 
managed and sustained forest sources. ogging. pulping and manufacturing 
processes are expected to conform to t environmental regulations of the 
country of origin. 
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. 
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 
Printed and bound in Great Britain by 
CPI Antony Rowe, Chlppenham and Eastbourne 
Philosophy and Happiness 
Edited by 
Lisa Bortolotti 
University of Birmingham 
palgrave 
.macmillan 
10 
The Politics of Happiness: 
Subjective vs. Economic Measures 
as Measures of Social Well-Being 
Erik Angner 
1. Introduction 
Though happiness and related mental states have been the object of 
systematic scientific study since the beginning of the twentieth century, 
interest in the topic has accelerated rapidly in the last few decades 
(Angner 2009). By now, psychologists, economists, and other social and 
behavioral scientists have convinced themselves that it is possible to 
develop reliable and valid measures of happiness (and the like), and that 
these measures can be used to study systematically the determinants and 
distribution of happiness (and such) in the population. The measures, 
which are often discussed under the heading of 'subjective measures 
of well-being,' are typically based on direct questions such as 'Taking 
things all together, how would you say things are these days - would 
you say you're very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy these days?' 
(Gurin et a1. 1960, p. 411; italics in original). Answers to such questions 
are used to construct numerical measures of both individual well-being 
(the well-being of persons) and social well-being (the well-being of 
groups).! 
Encouraged by evidence of reliability and validity, researchers have 
suggested that subjective measures should be used for a wide range of 
purposes. In particular, it is frequently argued that subjective measures 
of social well-being should replace or complement more traditional 
economic welfare measures - induding measures of national income 
like Gross Domestic Product (GDP), consumer surplus, and equiva-
lent and compensating variation - for purposes of the articulation, 
implementation, and evaluation of public policy. In this context, the 
nation of Bhutan is often held up as a model. As reported in a 200S 
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New }brk Times article titled 'A New Measure of Well-Being From a 
Little Kingdom,' Bhutanese King Jigme Singye Wangchuck since 
makes 'his nation's priority not its G.O.P. but its G.N.H., or gross 
national happiness' (Revkin 2005). But these ideas have gathered consid-
erable traction in the Western World as well. In Britain, the BBC reports, 
politicians on both sides of the political spectrum have expressed 
an interest in measuring and promoting 'the elusive feel-good factor' 
2006). In France, Le Monde takes President Nicolas Sarkozy, 
in recruiting Nobel Memorial Prize winners Amartya Sen and Joseph 
to reflect upon the limitations of traditional economic measures, 
to have opened up for the use of 'subjective elements' like happiness in 
'collective performance' (Le Monde 2008).2 
'1'0 support these efforts, several researchers have promoted the estab-
lishment of 'national well-being accounts' (Kahneman et a1. 2004) or 
'national indicators of well-being' (Diener and Seligman 2004, p. 21). 
National well-being accounts (NWBAs) would be analogous to national 
income and production accounts (NIPAs), but instead of tracking things 
like agricultural production they would track people's happiness, satis-
and so on.3 According to proponents, NWBAs would be good 
for social and behavioral scientists, who could use the information in 
studies, but above all they would be good for policy makers, 
who could use the data to take practical measures designed to promote 
well-being (Diener et al. 2008), Hence, 'The most important contribu-
tion of a national system of well-being indicators would be that they 
could focus the attention of policymakers and the public specifically on 
vv <:U-</<:1I: 0::. and not simply on the production of goods and services' 
\~.~U·~. and Seligman 2004, p. 21). When Ed Diener published a set of 
for the development of subjective indicators, while simulta-
U~'J"';>H endorsing their use to inform policy debates, he was able to 
recruit 48 co-signatories (Diener 2006). 
As the quote in the previous paragraph suggests, the drive for subjec-
tive measures to be used as indicators of social well-being is fuelled in 
part by widespread dissatisfaction with traditional economic mea-
sures.4 Though economic measures have been criticized on a variety 
of grounds, two themes are particularly common. Both are evidenced 
in the broadside attack on the GOP as a measure of social welfare 
Clifford Cobb and colleagues (1995). The first is the idea that eco-
nomic measures like GOP per capita contain no information about 
how resources are allocated and therefore are indifferent to the distri-
bution of benefits. Hence, 'The GOP totally ignores the distribution of 
for example, so that enormous gains at the top ... appear as 
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new bounty for all' (Cobb et al. 1995, p. 67). The second is the idea 
that economic measures contain no information about many things 
that really matter and therefore ignore important values. Among such 
things, Cobb and colleagues (1995, pp. 66-67) mention the preservation 
of natural resources, the quality of the environment, and the strength 
of social structures; they might have added values such as freedom, jus-
tice, fairness, and human rights. In particular, it can be argued, measures 
like GOP per capita contain no information about how benefits were 
accumulated. 
For all their evident differences, however, I will argue that traditional 
economic welfare measures and the now rather fashionable subjective 
measures of well-being have much in common. My main thesis is that 
economic and subjective measures - although they differ with respect 
to the underlying account of individual welfare in fact are based on 
the very same account of social welfare. Both economic and subjective 
measures, I will argue, are applications of the utilitarian social welfare 
function, according to which social welfare is the total or equivalently, 
when the size of the population is constant, the average welfare of the 
members of the group. The fact that economic and subjective measures 
are based on the same social welfare function implies, inter alia, that 
subjective measures of well-being when used as measures of social wel-
fare are vulnerable to many of the criticisms that traditionally have been 
leveled against economic measures. In particular, they are open to the 
charge that they are indifferent to distributional concerns as well as to 
the charge that they neglect to take into account values like the qual-
ity of the environment, freedom, justice, fairness, rights, and so on, as 
independent of well-being. 
There are several reasons why philosophers, psychologists, economists, 
and members of a concerned public should care about the theoretical 
foundations of alternative welfare measures. Above all, perhaps, the dis-
cussion has important practical ramifications. Since subjective measures 
suggest rather different answers to questions about the determinants 
and distribution of welfare, as compared to economic indicators, a 
shift to subjective measures for public policy and other purposes could 
have vast real-world implications. At the same time, because subjective 
measures of social well-being have much in common with their eco-
nomic counterparts, a shift to subjective measures would not address 
some of the most common complaints against traditional measures. 
Along the way, I hope to illustrate that much can be gained from a 
discussion of theoretical foundations: by making explicit fundamental 
commitments underlying different efforts to measure well-being, we can 
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achieve a better understanding of both advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative approaches to welfare measmement. 
2. The utilitarian social welfare function 
In order to argue that subjective and economic welfare measures are 
based on the same social welfare function, and that this makes them 
open to the same kind of criticism, I must first say a few things about 
what this social welfare function is. The utilitarian social welfare func-
tion says that the social welfare of a group in state S equals the sum 
of individual utilities across all members of the group in S (Mangin 
and d'Aspremont 1998, p. 415). It follows that the change in social 
welfare associated with a transition from state S to state S' is the dif-
ference between the sum of individual utilities in S' and the sum of 
individual utilities in S. Assuming that the population remains constant 
when going from S to S', the ranking of the two states will remain the 
same whether we are considering total utility or average utility; in this 
sense, then, it does not matter whether we use the one or the other. 
(Below, I will return to the case when the population does not remain 
constant.) 
To explain how problematic features of welfare measures can be traced 
to the utilitarian SOCial welfare function, I will follow Amartya Sen's 
exposition as it appears in Development as Freedom (1999). Sen argues 
that the utilitarian social welfare function is based on three different 
components. Each component tells us something about what counts, 
and what does not count, from the point of view of social welfare. The 
first component, consequentialism, says that 'all choices (of actions, rules, 
institutions, and so on) must be judged by their consequences, that is, 
by the results they generate' (Sen 1999, p. 58). This implies that, once 
a particular consequence has been specified, the manner in which it 
was brought about is of no importance from the point of view of social 
welfare. The process by which some outcome was brought about might 
have left a mark on that outcome, of course; the point is that processes 
count only if (and only insofar as) they affect the outcome. 
The second component, welfarism, 'restricts the judgments of state[s] 
of affairs to the utilities in the respective states' (Sen 1999, p. 59). As 
Sen points out, this implies that social welfare rankings do not depend 
on things like the violation of rights, the fulfillment of duties, and so 
on as independent of utilities. It is possible that violations of people's 
rights, and so on will have consequences for their own or other peo-
ple's welfare; the point is that rights violations and such count only if 
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(and only insofar as) they have effects on welfare. The third component, 
sum-ranking, 'requires that the utilities of different people be simply 
summed together to get their aggregate merit' (Sen 1999, p. 59). This 
is to say that only sum totals (or averages) matter, and that other prop-
erties of the underlying distribution of utilities do not. The distribution 
of resources might affect total welfare, of course: giving the peanut but-
ter to those allergic to nuts might yield less total utility than giving 
it to those who can eat it, as might giving all the resources to one 
individual rather than distributing them more equally. Yet, distribu-
tions matter only if (and only insofar as) they affect total (or average) 
utility. 
As Sen (1999, pp. 60-61) points out, the utilitarian approach - with 
its commitment to consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking - has 
much to be said in its favor. For one thing, the approach mandates 
that each individual count equally: from the point of view of social 
welfare, nobody's utility level gets more weight than anybody else's. 
Yet, the utilitarian approach has also been subjected to much criticism. 
Sen sums it up by identifying three problematic features of the utili-
tarian social welfare function. First, there is what he calls distributional 
indifference: 
The utilitarian calculus tends to ignore inequalities in the distribution 
of happiness (only the sum total matters - no matter how unequally 
distributed). We may be interested in general happiness, and yet 
want to pay attention not just to 'aggregate' magnitudes, but also 
to extents of inequalities of happiness. 
(Sen 1999, p. 62) 
The distributional indifference of the utilitarian function follows 
directly from sum-ranking, since sums (like averages) do not reflect the 
shape of the distribution. Second, there is what Sen refers to as neglect 
of rights, freedom, and other non-utility concerns: 'The utilitarian approach 
attaches no intrinsic importance to claims of rights and freedoms (they 
are valued only indirectly and only to the extent that they influence 
utilities)' (Sen 1999, p. 62). The neglect of non-utility concerns follows 
directly from welfarism, which says that only welfare matters. Third, 
there is what Sen calls adaptation and mental conditioning: 'Even the view 
the utilitarian approach takes of individual well-being is not very robust, 
since it can easily be swayed by mental conditioning and adaptive atti-
tudes' (Sen 1999, p. 62). (Because the last point concerns assessments of 
individual welfare, I will focus on the others.) It should be clear how the 
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first two problematic features distributional indifference and neglect 
of non-utility concerns can be traced directly to sum-ranking and 
welfarism. 
3. Economic welfare measures 
Welfare measurement has traditionally been dominated by economists, 
who have developed a variety of measures. In what follows, I will discuss 
the three most common kinds of economic social welfare measure. I will 
show that each measure is an application of the utilitarian social wel-
fare function in the sense that the measure follows logically from the 
utilitarian social welfare function in combination with some assump-
tion about how to assess individual utility level (or changes in such 
levels). Then, I will explain how the problematic features of eco-
nomic measures can be traced to the underlying utilitarian social welfare 
function. 
As we will see, proponents of economic welfare measures tend to 
assume that an individual is well off to the extent that her preferences 
are satisfied. That is, economic measures are based on preference-
satisfaction or desire-fulfillment accounts of well-being (Angner 2009; 
Hausman and McPherson 2006, p. 64). Notice that the satisfaction 
of is not the same thing as the feeling of satisfaction or 
the belief that one's preferences are satisfied; economic measures are 
intended to represent the former rather than the latter. Because util-
is understood as an index of preference satisfaction (Mongin and 
1998, p. 382), economists can legitimately talk about util-
even as identical to well-being without making any reference 
to subjective states like happiness, pleasure, and satisfaction. For each 
of the measures below, we will see that social welfare is assessed as the 
total or average of individual welfare levels, where individual welfare is 
understood in terms of preference satisfaction. 
National income. Efforts by economists to measure welfare go back at 
least to A. C. Pigou, whose book The Economics of Welfare ([1920] 1952) 
marks the birth of the field of welfare economics. Pigou is quite explicit 
about his desire to develop an index of welfare. The specific measure 
he proposes is the national dividend, or national income, by which he 
means 'that part of the objective income of the community, includ-
of course, income derived from abroad, which can be measured in 
rHr,n.,,,, (Pigou 1952, p. 31). Concepts related to the national dividend 
remain some of the most commonly used measures of welfare. Martha 
Nussbaum and Sen point out that measures like GDP per capita, in spite 
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of their well-known shortcomings, 'continue to be widely used when 
public policy is made' (Nussbaum and Sen 1993, p. 2). The importance 
of the national product as a measure of well-being helps explain the 
widespread concern with economic growth: since 'growth' is often used 
to refer to the first derivative of the national product, and 'growth rate' 
to refer to the second derivative, high growth (or growth rate) can be 
seen as an indication of future well-being. 
Why would anyone think that a measure of real income represents 
welfare? Pigou clearly thinks that it does: 'The economic welfare of the 
country is intimately associated with the size of the national dividend, 
and changes in economic welfare with changes in the size of the div-
idend' (Pigou 1952, p. 50).5 And many economists agree, as illustrated 
by the following passage: 
The output available to satisfy our wants and needs is one impor-
tant determinant of welfare. Whatever want, need, or social problem 
engages our attention, we ordinarily can more easily find resources to 
deal with it when output is large and growing that when it is not. 
(Denison 1971, p. 13) 
The fundamental idea is that greater output makes it possible to satisfy 
our wants and needs - that is, our preferences - to a greater degree; on 
the assumption that we are rational, this implies that we will. Modern 
economic theory, however, permits a far more sophisticated answer. 
Given a number of assumptions, for example, about the rationality of 
individuals and the nature of the budget set, and holding prices fixed, 
it can be shown that utility (understood in terms of preference sat-
isfaction) is strictly increasing in individual wealth (Mas-Colell et ai. 
1995, p. 56). That is to say, under certain assumptions, wealth can be 
shown to be a utility function. Assuming that total wealth is the sum of 
individual wealth, and that individual wealth corresponds to individual 
welfare, the utilitarian social welfare function implies that total wealth 
corresponds to social welfare. 
Consumer/producer surplus. An alternative way to evaluate the welfare 
consequences of policy interventions is in terms of consumer surplus (CS) 
and producer surplus (PS). The notion of consumer surplus goes back to 
Jules Dupuit ([1844] 1969), who wished to determine the conditions 
under which public works - such as the building of a bridge - can 
'be declared of public utility' (Dupuit 1969, p. 255). Dupuit's ideas 
were developed and popularized by Alfred Marshall ([1890] 1920), 
who defines the consumer surplus of a good as '[the] excess of the 
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which [the consumer] would be willing to pay rather than go 
without the thing, over that which he actually does pay' (Marshall 
] p. 124). The notions of CS/PS are widely used to evaluate 
the consequences of public poUcy. Hence, 'Consumer surplus is the 
overwhelming choice as a welfare indicator' (Slesnick 1998, p. 2110). 
CS/PS is the tool preferred by many economics textbooks 
when evaluating the welfare consequences, for example, of interven-
tions like price ceilings and trade restrictions (ct. Mankiw 2001, 'Part III: 
Markets and Welfare'). Total surplus is the sum of consumer and producer 
What is the justification for using total surplus as a measure of 
SOCial welfare? The idea is that a person's willingness-to-pay for a good 
reflects her marginal valuation, that is, what the thing is worth to her 
on the margin. This is the amount of money such that she would be 
Indifferent between receiving one unit of the good and receiving the 
dollar amount for sure. Under certain assumptions about the ratio-
of the consumer, and so on, it can be shown formally that 
an increase in consumer surplus corresponds to an increase in utility 
(Mas-Colell et at. 1995, p. 83). Thus, 'One could say that consumer sur-
expresses in observable monetary units an unobservable gain in 
utility; [by means of the notion of a consumer surplus] we transform 
the measurement problem from an unobservable dimension (utility) to 
an observable one (dollars)' Qohansson 1991, p. 41). On the assumption 
that individual surplus corresponds to individual utility, the utilitarian 
social welfare function implies that total surplus corresponds to social 
welfare. 
Compensating/equivalent variation. Yet another set of measures evolve 
around the concepts of compensating variation (CV) and equivalent varia-
tion (BV). These notions were developed in a series of publications by 
John R. Hicks (e.g., 1943), who had noted certain technical difficul-
ties associated with surplus measures. The CV is 'the amount of money, 
which when taken away from an individual after an economic change, 
leaves the person just as well off as before,' while the BV is 'the amount 
of money paid to an individual which, if an economic change does 
not happen, leaves the individual just as well off as if the change had 
occurred' Oust et a1. 2004, p. 9). CV/EV measures are used in many 
contexts to assess changes in welfare. Hence: 
In cost-benefit analysis and other exercises in applied welfare eco-
nomics, aggregate willingness-to-pay - the simple sum of Hicksian 
compensating variations, is often used as a test. A positive sum is 
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taken as evidence of a social improvement or an increase in economic 
efficiency. 
(Blackorby and Donaldson 1990, p. 472; italics in original) 
As this quote indicates, aggregate CV or EV is computed by adding up 
individual compensating or eqUivalent variations. 
Why should measures of aggregate CV lEV be treated as social wel-
fare measures? Here is the basic idea: 'The motivation for the Hicksian 
measures is that an observable alternative for measuring the intensities 
of preferences of an individual for one situation versus another is the 
amount of money the individual is willing to payor willing to accept to 
move from one situation to another' Oust et al. 2004, p. 9; italics in 
original). The idea is that willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept 
measures reflect utilities (in the sense of degrees of preference satis-
faction) in alternative states. Indeed, it can be demonstrated formally 
that under a wide range of conditions, CV lEV measures are utility 
functions (Mas-Colell et a1. 1995, pp. 81-82). On the assumption that 
individual CV lEV corresponds to individual utility, the utilitarian social 
welfare function implies that aggregate CV lEV corresponds to social 
welfare. 
Given that economic measures of all three kinds are straightforward 
applications of the utilitarian social welfare function, it should not be 
surprising that Sen's three components of the utilitarian social welfare 
function are implicit in these measures. First, each measure satisfies con-
sequentialism, since what matters is the utility of outcomes, which are 
bundles of goods. Once an outcome has been specified, the process by 
which individuals achieved their bundles has no impact on utilities. 
Second, each measure satisfies welfarism, since social welfare is a func-
tion of individual welfare alone. Hence, values like rights, duties, and 
so on have no impact on social welfare above and beyond their effect 
on individual utilities. Third, each measure satisfies sum-ranking, since 
aggregate measures are obtained by adding or averaging over individ-
ual utility levels. Thus, holding total or average utility constant, the 
distribution of utilities has no social welfare implications.6 
Since economic measures are applications of the utilitarian social 
welfare function, and since this function is associated with several prob-
lematic features (including distributional indifference and neglect of 
non-utility concerns), it should not be surprising that orthodox eco-
nomic measures have been criticized precisely, first, for being indifferent 
to distributional concerns, and second, for ignoring important values 
like justice, fairness, rights, and the quality of the environment. In fact, 
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I hope to have shown that it is fair to say that the two problematic 
features of economic measures can be traced directly to the underlying 
utilitarian social welfare function. In the next section, I will argue that 
subjective measures in spite of their evident differences - are based on 
the very same social welfare function and therefore are open to many of 
the same charges. 
4. Subjective measures of well-being 
Although subjective measures of well-being are often described as a rel-
recent phenomenon, their history can be traced back to the 
twentieth century. Subjective measures appear to have emerged in 
studies into marital success and educational psychology in the 1920s 
and 1930s, and to have gained currency in the 1960s as a result of 
developments in gerontology, the epidemiology of mental health, and 
the social indicator movement; more recently, they have been high-
lighted by the emergence of the positive psychology movement in 
the 1990s (Angner 2009). In what follows, I will discuss some of the 
most common kinds of subjective measure of social well-being. I will 
show that such measures are straightforward application of the util-
itarian social welfare function in the exact same sense as economic 
measures are. 
As we will see, proponents of subjective measures of well-being tend 
to assume that an individual is well off to the extent that she is 
in some particular mental state (or states), whether happiness, satis-
....... v'''1 or similar. That is, subjective measures are based on mental 
state accounts of well-being (Angner, in press). Consider the following 
passage: 'Subjective well-being research [ ... ] is concerned with individ-
uals' subjective experiences of their lives. The underlying assumption 
is that well-being can be defined by people's conscious experiences -
in terms of hedonic feelings or cognitive satisfactions' (Diener and Suh 
p. 191). Notice that Diener and Suh argue that well-being is not 
only concemed with individual's subjective experiences, but is defined by 
them. For each of the measures below, we will see that social welfare 
is assessed as the total or average of individual welfare levels, where 
individual welfare is understood in terms of some mental state (or 
Subjective measures are typically based on data gathered using 
questionnaires or interviews, though more sophisticated tools like Palm 
Pilots have been employed too? Many researchers use a direct ques-
tion like that quoted in the Introduction. Others use small batteries 
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of questions. For instance, the widely used Subjective Happiness Scale 
(Lyubomirsky and Lepper 1999) has four questions, including: 
1. In general, I consider myself: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not a very happy 
person 
6 7 
A very happy 
person 
2. Compared to most of my peers, I consider myself: 
1 
Less happy 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
More happy 
(Lyubomirskyand Lepper 1999, p. 151) 
After subjects have circled one number for each of the four ques-
tions, a total happiness score is computed as the average of the four 
answers, with the last one reverse scored (Lyubomirsky and Lepper 
1999, p. 41). 
The history of subjective measures offers a fascinating range of meth-
ods used to elicit subjects' happiness, satisfaction, and so on (ct. Angner 
2009). In one pioneering study, Goodwin Watson (1930) asks subjects 
whether they satisfy descriptions like: 'Cheerful, gay spirits most of the 
time. Occasionally bothered by something but can usually laugh it off,' 
'Ups and downs, now happy about things, now depressed. About bal-
anced in the long run,' and 'Life often seems so worthless that there 
is little to keep one going. Nothing matters very much, there has been 
so much of hurt that laughter would be empty mockery' (Watson 1930, 
p. 81). Hornell Hart (1940) gives subjects 24 synonyms and 24 antonyms 
of 'happy,' and asks them to cirde words that apply and cross out words 
that do not apply to them. Hadley Cantril (1965, p. 22) relies on a 'lad-
der of life': a ladder-like shape where the rungs have been numbered 
from 0 to 10. The subject is told, 'Here is a picture of a ladder. Suppose 
we say that the top of the ladder (POINTING) represents the best possible 
life for you and the bottom (POINTING) represents the worst possible life 
for you,' and asked, 'Where on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP 
AND DOWN THE LADDER) do you feel you personally stand at the present 
time?' (Cantril 1965, p. 23).8 In every case, a single quantitative measure 
of well-being is computed on the basis of the answers. 
More recently, Daniel Kahneman and Alan B. Krueger (2006) have sug-
gested the use of a measure they call the U-index. The U-index is clearly 
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intended to be a measure of social well-being, as it is introduced under 
the heading of 'A Measure of Society's ' The 'U' stands for 
or 'undesirable,' and the index 'measures the proportion 
of time an individual spends in an unpleasant state' (Kahneman and 
2006, p. 18). The two use data collected using so-called 'Expe-
rience Sampling' or 'Day Reconstruction' methods, which give a dense 
record of an individual's emotional state along several dimensions of 
over time. An episode gets classified as unpleasant or undesirable 
'if the most intense feeling reported for that episode is a negative one _ 
that is, if the highest rating on any of the negative affect dimensions is 
greater than the maximum of rating of the positive affect dimen-
sions' (Kahneman and Krueger 2006, p. 19). The U-index, which will be 
number between zero and one, is easily computed as the fraction of 
long episodes so classified. 
To construct a measure of individual well-being, researchers assign a 
number to a person based on his or her response to direct questions 
about his or her mental state(s). Psychologists do not deny that the 
use of happiness self-reports may lead to measurement artifacts, but 
nevertheless argue that there is ample evidence supporting the relia-
and validity of subjective measures (d. Diener and Suh 1999, 
pp. 436-38). First, subjective measures are thought to exhibit adequate 
test-retest reliability and convergent validity, in the sense that they are 
sufficiently correlated with happiness ratings of friends and family, psy-
cnOlC)glsts judgments, amount of smiling, and inversely correlated with 
Second, subjective measures are thought to exhibit adequate 
discriminant validity, in that they are not overly correlated with gen-
eral intelligence, current mood, humility, the language in which the 
'IU't::;)LJiVU was asked, and the like. Though a discussion of the short-
of these measures is ongoing, scientific research these days 
focuses relatively less on establishing reliability and validity and more 
on examining empirical relationships. 
Relying on subjective measures of well-being, psychologists claim to 
have established several empirical phenomena. For one thing, many 
studies find that there is only a weak relation between income and 
subjective well-being (SWB) and that the effect diminishes with increas-
income, As Ed Diener and Robert Biswas-Diener write, 'for middle 
and upper-income people in economically developed nations, acquir-
more income is not likely to strongly enhance SWB. Indeed, 
some studies find that rising wages predict less well-being' (Diener and 
Blswas-Diener 2002, p. 161). Psychologists have concluded that even 
rapid economic growth is not in general associated with measurable 
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increases in subjective well-being (Diener and Biswas-Diener 2002, p. 
139), but that people who live in rich countries are on the average 
happier than people living in poor countries (Diener and Biswas-Diener 
2002, p. 136), These results - and others like them - are often explained 
by reference point phenomena (Argyle 1999), adaptation (Frederick and 
Loewenstein 1999), and misprediction (Loewenstein and Schkade 1999). 
Though provisional, these findings indicate that subjective measures 
will give rather different answers to questions about the determinants 
and distribution of well-being as compared to economic measures. This 
supports the contention that a shift from economic to subjective mea-
sures of well-being for public policy purposes could have a potentially 
dramatic impact. 
To construct a measure of social well-being for some group, researchers 
typically take the simple average of the scores of the members of the 
group. As Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch note, 'a large fraction 
of the happiness literature in economics is based on comparing average 
happiness scores for large numbers of people' (Di Tella and MacCulloch 
2006, p. 29). When researchers compare different nations, for exam-
ple, they typically compute the mean happiness or satisfaction score 
in each nation and compare and contrast those levels (Diener and Suh 
1999, p. 435; ct. Diener 2000, p. 39). To get a measure of social well-
being based on the U-index, Kahneman and Krueger propose that the 
'U-index can be computed for each individual [ ... 1 and averaged over 
a sample of individuals' (Kahneman and Krueger 2006, p. 20). On the 
assumption that the number assigned to an individual by some subjec-
tive measure corresponds to her well-being, the utilitarian social welfare 
function implies that the average of such scores corresponds to social 
welfare. The most commonly used subjective measures of social well-
being, then, are applications of the utilitarian social welfare function in 
the same sense as economic measures are. 
Because the typical subjective measure of social well-being is an appli-
cation of the utilitarian social welfare function, it is unsurprising that 
the three components of that function are implicit in subjective mea-
sures too. First, subjective measures satisfy consequentialism, since only 
outcomes - specifically, the degree to which individuals end up happy, 
satisfied, and so on - matter. The processes by which an outcome obtains 
are taken into account only if (and only insofar as) they have an effect 
on the outcome. Second, subjective measures satisfy welfarism, since 
nothing but welfare - here, understood in terms of mental states -
matters from the point of view of social welfare. Other values are taken 
into account only if (and insofar as) they have an effect on welfare so 
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understood. Third, subjective measures satisfy sum-ranking, since social 
welfare is a simple sum or average of individual welfare levels. That is, 
of the distribution of welfare matter only if (and only insofar 
affect sum totals or averages. 
It is equally unsurprising that subjective measures of social well-being 
are open to many of the same criticisms as traditional economic mea-
sures are. First, subjective measures are indifferent to the distribution 
of benefits: holding averages constant, whether happiness and other 
mental states are equally or unequally distributed across the popula-
tion has no impact on subjective measures of social well-being. Second, 
measures of well-being neglect values other than welfare 
n(1pr':~nC\rl in terms of mental states): whether high happiness scores 
were obtained because people live free, dignified lives or because they are 
slaves has no effect. This latter point is particularly important in 
of (apparent) phenomena like adaptation: measures of subjective 
n-.;"-• .I ..... ,,'"' contain no information about whether people are in some 
mental state because they have lived successful lives in which 
aU their truest goals have been reached, or because their goals and aspi-
rations have been so stunted by deprivation and oppression that they 
have decided to be happy anyway. 
Not all researchers construct subjective measures of social well-being 
averaging over the sample. Some researchers use other measures of 
central tendency like the median (cf. Angner et a1. in press); some assess 
social welfare by the fraction of participants who answered 'very happy' 
in response to a question like that quoted in the Introduction (see, e.g., 
Easterlin 1974). Measures constructed in this way are not applications 
of the utilitarian social welfare function as it has been defined here. It 
is worth noting that departures from the additive function appear moti-
vated not by a rejection of the utilitarian welfare function as much as 
features of the data. Angner and colleagues use medians rather than 
means because happiness scores are strongly negatively skewed; Easter-
Un uses 'percent very happy' figures because individual responses are 
on a three-point, ordinal scale. Thus, these authors do not necessarily 
the utilitarian account of social welfare; they may simply operate 
under constraints that make the use of the function inappropriate. No 
matter, the use of medians or 'percent very happy' figures are open to 
the very same charges as the use of means is. The median is no more 
sensitive to the shape of the distribution than the mean is, and the 
fact that fraction x of the population is 'very happy' ignores whether 
the remaining I-x is 'pretty happy' or 'not too happy.' In addition, of 
course, neither approach pays attention to values other than welfare. 
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Hence, subjective measures of social well-being based on medians or 
'percent very happy' figures exhibit both distributional indifference and 
neglect of non-utility concerns. 
5. Discussion 
In this chapter, I have compared the now rather fashionable subjective 
measures of social well-being to more traditional economic welfare 
measures. We have seen that there are, in fact, important differ-
ences. Perhaps the most important difference relates to the underlying 
accounts of individual well-being. Proponents of economic welfare 
measures typically assume that welfare is a matter of preference satis-
faction. That is, economic measures are based on preference-satisfaction 
or desire-fulfillment accounts of well-being. Meanwhile, proponents of 
subjective measures of well-being typically assume that well-being is 
a matter of being in a certain mental state. That is, subjective mea-
sures are based on mental state accounts of well-being. Angner (2009) 
argues that economic and subjective measures also presuppose differ-
ent approaches to measurement. While economic measures tend to 
be justified by reference to observable orderings, subjective measures 
are designed to represent 'latent,' unobservable, constructs. Thus, eco-
nomic and subjective measures differ both when it comes to accounts 
of well-being and approaches to measurement. 
For all their evident differences, however, I have argued that subjective 
measures in fact are based on the very same social welfare function as 
economic measures are. It should not be surprising, then, that they have 
many features in common or that many of the charges that have tra-
ditionally been leveled against economic measures can also be leveled 
against subjective measures. In particular, subjective measures are open 
to the charge that they are indifferent to distributional concerns and 
to the charge that they neglect to take into account important values 
other than welfare. This conclusion holds whether the measure of SOCial 
welfare is constructed using the mean, the median, or the 'percent very 
happy' figure. Commonalities between economic and subjective mea-
sures have so far received little attention in the literature, which tends 
to emphasize the differences. 
It might be thought that my argument to the effect that subjective 
measures are indifferent to the distribution of benefits is undermined 
by the fact that subjective measures can be used to compare welfare 
levels of men and women, the healthy and the unhealthy, and so on. 
It should be noted, however, that when comparing welfare levels of 
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men and women, for example, measures of individual well-being are 
used to construct two measures of social well-being - one for men and 
one for women - which are then compared with each other. And each 
of these measures is insensitive to the distribution of benefits in the 
population it concerns. (n this regard, in fact, subjective measures are 
analogous to economic measures, which are frequently used to 
assess things like income inequality, that is, inequality in the distribu-
tion of incomes. Thus, the claim that subjective measures can be used to 
examine (happiness) inequality is no more an argument against the the-
sis that subjective measures exhibit distributional indifference, than the 
claim that economic measures can be used to examine (income) inequal-
is an argument against the thesis that economic measures exhibit 
distributional indifference. As soon as an aggregate measure is computed 
the mean (or similar), some information about the distribution 
is lost. 
It is possible that proponents of NWBAs are aware of the prob-
lems associated with subjective measures. This would explain, for 
why some authors insist that subjective measures of social 
wen-being and NWBAs should complement rather than substitute for 
traditional economic measures and NIPAs. For example, Diener and 
co~authors 
[ ... } take care not to claim [ ... ] that subjective well-being mea-
sures should dominate policy considerations or replace other useful 
measures, but instead take the more moderate view that subjec-
tive well-being measures can add useful information to the existing 
national accounts of quality of life. 
(Diener et a1. 2008, p. 41; d. Diener and Suh 1999, p. 448) 
insofar as the new measures face the same problems as the old ones, 
it is far from obvious that using the former as a complement to the latter 
will help us overcome those problems. It can, plausibly, be argued that 
a combination of subjective and economic measures is superior because 
although both neglect important values, the two neglect different impor-
tant values. Still, the degree to which this move helps overcome the 
problem is uncertain, and it does not address the issue of distributional 
indifference. Moreover, it can be maintained that the use of some com-
bination of measures might be worse, insofar as it falsely instills the 
confidence that obstacles have been overcome.9 
Until now, I have assumed that the population is constant, so that 
SOCial welfare functions based on total and average utility yield the same 
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rankings. In reality, of course, the assumption is often not warranted, 
so rankings based on total and average utility need not coincide. If so, 
we must draw a distinction between total utilitarianism, according to 
which social welfare is the total utility in the population, and average 
utilitarianism, according to which social welfare is the average utility 
(Hausman and McPherson 2006, p. 102). Because subjective measures of 
social well-being are constructed using averages rather than totals, such 
measures are applications of the average utilitarian social welfare func-
tion. The difference might seem arcane, but there are contexts where it 
matters. Consider, for example, the empirical finding that patients who 
have been diagnosed with cancer are in general no less happy than those 
who have not (Angner et a1. in press). Such results may be attributed in 
part to the fact that the studies in question only sample the living, and 
therefore in effect compare cancer survivors to those who were never 
diagnosed with the disease (thus giving no weight to patients who did 
not survive the disease). 
This pOint is closely related to what has become known as the repug-
nant conclusion: the implication that the elimination of individuals of 
below-average welfare increases social welfare, whereas the generation 
of such individuals decreases it (provided, in both cases, the elimination 
or generation of such individuals does not affect others' welfare levels) 
(Hausman and McPherson 2006, pp. 102-(3). The repugnant conclu-
sion is a major Challenge for average utilitarians, and it obviously affects 
subjective measures of social well-being as well. Notice that the repug-
nant conclusion also affects economic measures based on averages, like 
GDP per capita: the elimination of individuals whose contribution to 
GDP is below average would seem to increase social welfare, whereas 
the generation of such individuals would seem to decrease it. (This par-
ticular problem is not an issue for measures based on total utility, like 
CSIPS and CV lEV measures, though total utilitarianism has issues of 
its own.) 
Either way, I hope to have shown that much can be gained from 
a discussion of philosophical foundations of alternative measures of 
well-being. By taking explicit account of philosophical foundations in 
general, and underlying accounts of individual and social welfare in 
particular, it is possible to identify interesting features of both sub-
jective and economic measures. The identification of such features, in 
turn, permits a more informed assessment of relative advantages and 
disadvantages of the measures. Indeed, it can be argued that some atten-
tion to philosophical foundations is unavoidable: a complete defense 
of a given welfare measure might have to say something, for example, 
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about the nature of welfare. Thus, whether our goal is to understand, 
or defend, a given approach to welfare measurement, attention 
to fundamental assumptions is well worthwhile. 
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Notes 
Following standard practice in the literature, I will use the terms 'well-being,' 
'welfare,' and 'utility' interchangeably. 
Translations are my own. 
In the United States, the task of developing NIPAs was assigned to Simon 
Kuznets in the early 19305. Kuznets who would be awarded the 1971 
Nobel Memorial Prize originally conceived of these accounts as a vehi-
cle for exploring issues of distribution and consumption, social justice and 
social welfare, as well as production. Changing priorities during World War 
II drastically and pennanently reshaped them, however, leaving Kuznets 
hugely disappointed and sharply critical of the accounts and their use in 
assessments of social well-being (Perlman and Marietta 2(05). 
Some dissatisfaction with economic indicators is evident in most writings on 
national well-being accounts (ct. Diener 2000, pp. 40--41; Diener and Selig-
man 2004, pp. 21-22; Kahneman et a!. 2004, p. 433; Diener et al. 2008, p. 
40; Diener and Tov 2007). 
While Pigou is careful to draw a distinction between 'welfare' and 'economic 
welfare,' 'that part of social welfare that can be brought directly or indirectly 
into relation with the measuring-rod of money,' he nevertheless proceeds on 
the presumption that changes In the latter will correspond to changes in the 
former (Pigou 1952, p. 11; ct. p. 20). 
Though economists sometimes argue that Interpersonal comparisons of util-
ity are impossible (Sen 1999, p. 303, n. 6), most economic welfare measures 
(as we have seen) in fact do assume that it is meaningful to add or average 
Individual utilities. 
r;or a usdul overview of empirical research using subjective measures, see, 
for example, Diener and Seligman (2004). 
The parenthetical notes in small caps are Cantril's instructions to the 
experimenter. 
See Angner (2006) for an extended discussion of problems associated with 
overconfidence among economists. 
